Method
. Trial overview for all experiments. The figure shows the trial timeline, which was the identical for all three experiments (and all control experiments). Variable durations were drawn from a uniform distribution.
Materials and stimuli
The experiments were conducted in a sound attenuated experimental chamber on a PC connected to a 19" CRT monitor. The aversive reinforcement was a monopolar 100 ms DCpulse electric stimulation (STM200; Biopac Systems Inc, www.biopac.com) applied to the participant's non-dominant forearm. In all experiments, the electric stimulator was attached before the conditioning block. The intensity of the electric shock stimulation was adjusted individually for each participant in a thresholding procedure, based on the standard criterion "unpleasant but not painful". In Experiments 2 & 3, the shock thresholding procedure was conducted after the conditioning block (see below), while in Experiment 1 (and Experiment 3C), the shock thresholding procedure occurred by necessity before conditioning. The CS+ color was counter balanced across participants.
Skin conductance during the conditioning block was measured by Ag-AgCL electrodes attached to the distal phalanges of the index and middle finger of the left hand. The physiological signals were amplified and filtered between 0.05 and 5Hz. Phasic skin conductance responses (SCRs) were scored as an increase in skin conductance within 0.5 to 4.5 sec after stimulus onset (1). Responses below .02 µS were scored as zero and the raw SCR scores were z-transformed prior to analysis.
Additional information about Task and procedure
In Experiment 1, the participants were exposed to a standard protocol for Pavlovian (classical) threat/fear conditioning, in which they received mild electric shocks (US) to one (CS+, 4 out of 6 presentations) but not the other (CS-) of two stimuli (CS identity was counter-balanced across subjects in all experiments).
In Experiment 2, the participants were exposed to a standard protocol for observational threat/fear learning (1), in which they viewed a video of an individual receiving mild electric shocks (US) to one (CS+, 4 out of 6 presentations) but not the other (CS-) of two stimuli. Experiment 3 used a modified procedure for instructed threat/fear conditioning (2) , where the experimenter first instructed the participant that they could receive shocks to one (CS+), but never the other (CS-) cue. In addition, the same instruction was presented for 1 s before every cue presentation during the conditioning block (12 presentations) . In order to avoid extinction and maintain the instructed threat expectations in the absence of shocks during the conditioning block, which is crucial for the comparison with observational threat learning, the participants never observed the CS cues (see below "Experiment 3B" for a control experiment where the CS cues were displayed during the conditioning block). Instead, two control cues were displayed (red and green triangles, 6 times each) during the conditioning block. This design thereby allowed the instructed threat expectation for the CS+ cue to be maintained in the absence of shocks.
During decision-making, the location of the stimuli varied randomly between the left and right position across trials to prevent spatial selection strategies. After observational threat learning, the participants in Experiment 2 were asked to rate their experience of watching the Demonstrator receiving shocks.
Power calculations and statistical analysis
Sample size for Experiment 1 was determined using a power analysis, based on the effect size (Cohen's D = .93) of the Transfer phase in Experiment 4 of ref. (3) , which had a similar design. Forty participants gave a power of .80 to discover an equivalent effect size. We adopted the same sample size for Experiments 2-3.
Reported main and interaction effects were evaluated with "Type III" analysis of deviance (i.e., analogous to Type III Sum of Squares ANOVA) tests based on the Wald statistic. We report unstandardized parameter estimates as effect sizes for GLMMs, and 95% confidence intervals based on the normal distribution. In all analyses of average differences between groups, we included a logarithmic term for trial number (by phase, i.e., ln[1-35]) as a nuisance regressor to account for non-linear individual differences in learning curves (Including this regressor improves statistical model fit in all analyses. All results are qualitatively identical without this regressor). For consistency with these analyses, all figures depicting effects averaged across trials (e.g., Fig. 3 -5 A, main text) show estimates adjusted for learning curves.
Competing Systems Model
The competing systemsmodel was based on two independent, basic reinforcement learning algorithms. During conditioning, the Pavlovian controller learned to predict aversive outcomes:
where R = [-1,0], and α is the learning rate. During decision-making, the instrumental controller learned the expected value of actions in an identical manner:
where R = [-1,1] (4, 5), and α is, for simplicity, the same learning rate as used by the Pavlovian controller. In contrast, the Pavlovian controller learned about the compound stimulus ij during decision-making because the two cues were presented together and coterminated with the decision ( Figure S1 ):
( + 1) = ( ) + ( ( ) − ( ( ) + ( ))) [3] As expressed in the Rescorla-Wagner rule (6) , the consequence of this is that no differential Pavlovian learning occurs during decision-making. In other words, the Pavlovian influence was constant during decision-making (assuming no Pavlovian updating at all during decisionmaking gives almost identical predictions). Finally, the learned cue values (VPavlovian and QInstrumental) from both systems are multiplied to compute the probability of choice i at time t.
We express competition between controllers in a standard Softmax function:
where β (0< β ≤ 1) regulates how deterministically the action with the highest value will be chosen, n refers to cues A & B, and ω is the relative weight on the Pavlovian system.
Model simulations
The simulations of the competing systems -model were conducted using the same reinforcement probabilities and number of trials as in the experiment, but independent of the experimental time-series (i.e., simulated participants). We refer to these as the a priori predictions of the model. These were derived from the mean performance across 100 model runs for each parameter combination (0.01≤ α ≤ 1, 0.01 ≤ β ≤ 1, in steps of 0.1. ω was set to 0.5), and are displayed in Figure 2C of the main text.
We also we investigated the predictions of the competing systemsmodel in more detail. We first asked how the Pavlovian weight normatively should be set to promote adaptive behavior. To address this, we simulated the model to find the weight that maximized decision-making performance (i.e., minimized punishment) for different probabilities of environmental change (C parameter). The simulations showed that if the environment on average is stable, a positive weight (with the optimum at ω = .5) on the Pavlovian controller is adaptive ( Figure S2 ). As we describe in the main text, ω was not different from 0.5 in either Exp. 1 or 2, suggesting that behavior well-adjusted under the assumption of a stable environment. What happens if Pavlovian weight is positive and the environment in fact does change? As we describe in the main text ( Figure 2 ), this results in strictly maladaptive decision-making.
To assess how the generality of prediction of maladaptive decision-making after an environmental change, we plot the average difference in decision-making performance between No Change and Change groups (for ω = .5) across the parameter space for the learning rate α and temperature β ( Figure S4 ). The figure shows that the prediction that changing the environment will lead to maladaptive decision making is a general feature of the model. Similarly, we plot ( Figure S5 ) predicted difference in behavior if the environment is unstable also during decision-making, as in the Reversal phase of our experimental task (see Figure 2 , main text). As seen, the reversal of the Pavlovian influence generalizes across the parameter space.
Figure S2. Consequences of Pavlovian weighting for adaptive behavior (A)
Decisionmaking performance as a function of the weight, ω, on the Pavlovian controller and the probability (parameter C) that the environment changes from fear conditioning to decisionmaking (averaged across 100 runs for parameter combination of α and β). The horizontal dotted line indicates for reference the average performance if the Pavlovian influence is null (ω = 0). For a stable environment, ω = 0.5 is optimal.
Figure S3. A one-system model where a single controller system learns during both conditioning and decision-making does not predict a difference between groups after the reversal.
A priori asymptotic model predictions (by simulating across the range of the model parameters and taking the mean as expectation, see Methods) for the No-change (turquoise line) and Change (magenta line) condition derived from a one systemmodel where the same expected values were updated in both condition and decision-making (i.e., a basic Q-learning model). See Table S1 -S2 for quantitative evaluation of this model. Figure S4 . Simulation of the competing systems -model across the parameter space of the prediction that an environmental change results in maladaptive decision-making (i.e., P(Optimal) No Change > P(Optimal) Change) during Transfer (for ω = 0.5). Empirical values were within the range of predictions (Exp. 1 = 0.11, Exp. 2 = 0.23). Each cell is the average of 100 simulation runs. Figure S5 . Simulation of the competing systems -model across the across parameter space of the prediction that the difference between the groups would reverse in the Reversal phase (i.e., P(Optimal) Change > P(Optimal) No Change) (for ω = 0.5). Empirical values were within the range of predictions (Exp. 1 = 0.13, Exp. 2 = 0.24). Each cell is the average of 100 simulation runs.
Parameter estimation
Parameter estimation was conducted using the maximum-likelihood approach, which finds the set of parameters that maximize the probability of the participant´s trial-by-trial choices given the model. Optimization was done by to minimizing the negative log-likelihood, -L, computed by:
where T denotes the total number of trials. Parameters were independently fitted to each subject using the BFGS optimization method. To avoid local minima in parameter fitting, optimization was initiated with 10 randomly selected start values. Model implementations and parameter fitting was done in R (R Development Core Team, 2012).
Model comparison
Model comparison was primarily based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), a measure of goodness of fit of a model that penalizes complexity (7):
where -ln(L) is the negative log-likelihood and k is the number of model parameters. A smaller AIC hence indicates a better model fit.
We summed the AIC across participants, and calculated AIC weights (wAIC) from the summed AIC, to derive a group-level measure of model fit. The wAIC can be interpreted as the probability that a given model has the lowest AIC, and thus best fit, in the set of candidate models (8) .
Results

Competing systems
One only included instrumental Q-values) showed that the competing systemsmodel explained the data best. The One system models either had the same learning rate, α, in the conditioning and decision-making blocks (One system 1, cf. Figure S2 ), or different learning rates in the two blocks (One system 2). The table displays summed (across participants) Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (smaller values indicate better model fit), and mean (standard deviation) parameter estimates for the three models. Akaike Information Criterion weights (wAIC) can be interpreted as the probability that the model has the lowest AIC in the candidate set, and thereby provides the best explanation of the data. only included the instrumental Q-values) showed that the competing systemsmodel explained the data best. The One system -models either had the same learning rate, α, in the conditioning and decision-making blocks (One system 1, cf. Figure S2) , or different learning rates in the two blocks (One system 2). The table displays summed (across participants) Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (smaller values indicate better model fit), and mean (standard deviation) parameter estimates for the three models. Akaike Information Criterion weights (wAIC) can be interpreted as the probability that the model has the lowest AIC in the candidate set, and thereby provides the best explanation of the data.
Conditioned autonomic arousal responses does not predict Pavlovian transfer
We tested if individual differences in conditioned autonomic skin conductance responses (SCR) predicted the magnitude of Pavlovian transfer (focusing on the Transfer phase of the decision-making block). This was not the case. We assess individual differences in the differential (CS+>CS-) SCR response, in interaction with Group (Change/No Change) and
Experiment (Exp. 1/Exp. 2 [we excluded Exp. 3 due to the absence of a transfer effect in that experiment). If higher SCR during conditioning predicts the transfer magnitude, we would expect a SCR*Group interaction (because the slopes should have different signs). Neither this interaction (χ 2 (1) = 0.19, p = .67), the main effect (χ 2 (1= 0.27, p = 0.6), nor interaction with Experiment (χ 2 (1) = 0.15, p = 0.7) were significant. In other words, in our paradigm, individual differences in conditioned responses, as indexed by SCR, did not predict the magnitude of transfer, neither in Pavlovian, nor in observational conditioning. Although at first glance puzzling, it is known from non-human animals that physiological reactions thought to indicate conditioned threat responses typically do not predict avoidance behaviors (9) . Thus, the relationship between affective state, physiological correlate, and instrumental behavior might not be as straightforward as the first glance suggests.
Empathy with the Demonstrator and the unpleasantness of watching the Demonstrator receiving shocks predicts Pavlovian transfer in Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 (observational threat learning), the participants were prompted for their impressions of the Demonstrator directly after the conditioning block. We asked (i) how given the large number of predictors, and importance are unknown and requires future investigation. Because the influence of the conditioning block on decision-making did not reliably differ between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (see main text), we pooled the data from these experiments to maximize estimation precision. We first compared decision-making in the Transfer phase against the neutral baseline experiment, and found that the Change group had significantly reduced performance relative to this baseline (β = -.59, SE = .27, z = -2.22, p = .026). In contrast, the No change group had facilitated performance (β = 0.88, SE = 0.27, z = 3.33, p = .0008), Figure S6 . Thus, in line with previous PIT findings (11) , transfer of Pavlovian associations was maladaptive when misaligned with instrumental decision-making, but beneficial when aligned (the same pattern was evident when analyzing the experiments separately, although the effects were stronger in Experiment 2). In the Reversal phase, none of the groups were significantly different from the baseline experiment, although both effects had the expected signs (i.e., reversed relative to the Transfer phase) and similar magnitudes:
Comparison with a baseline control experiment without a conditioning block
No Change groups versus baseline (β = -.4, SE = .28, z = -1.43, p = 0.15), and Change groups versus baseline (β = 0.42, SE = .28, z = 1.48, p = .14) (see Figure S6 ). Does the competing systemsmodel predict the same pattern? To address this, we conducted simulations of the baseline condition (by setting the Pavlovian weight, ω, to 0).
As depicted in Figure S7 , this was the case: the model predictions accurately captured the qualitative empirical pattern (c.f., Figure S6 ). As described in the main text, model predictions were generated by simulating the model across the parameter range, and using the average as the expectation. In other words, the simulations were not informed by the empirical results.
These results demonstrate that the competing systemsmodel captures many important features of how Pavlovian associations transfer to decision-making. Figure S6 ).
Additional model comparison in Experiment 3.
The model comparison in the main text is based on a fixed effects model comparison method (i.e., group AIC weights), which can be sensitive to outliers. To ascertain the robustness of the conclusions that different computational mechanisms underlie the transfer from observational and instructed threat learning, we in addition used Bayesian random effects model comparison, which allows for model heterogeneity between participants (12) . To this end, we used both the AIC ( Figure S8 ) and the BIC ( Figure S9 ) as approximations to model evidence, and computed the exceedance probability for each model. We used both AIC and BIC as these two criteria penalize model complexity differently (13) . The exceedance probability expresses the probability that a given model is the most common model among the candidate models in the population (12) . These additional model comparisons provided converging results with those reported in the main text, and strengthen our conclusion that different models best describe the transfer of observational versus instructed threat learning. See following sections "Additional details about the Prior model" and "Difference in predictions from the Competing Systems -and Prior -models" for additional information. 
Additional details about the Prior -model
The Priormodel, which best described the data in Experiment 3, states that instruction (or advice, as in its original applications (14, 15) ) determines the initial instrumental action (i.e., Q) values at the outset of the decision-making block (see Figure S10 ). This differs from the Competing Systems -model (and most other models we consider), where the instrumental action values were initialized to 0. Specifically, in the Prior -model, the action values associated with the CS+ and CS-cues differed on trial 1: QCS+ (t = 1) = -ρN and QCS-(t = 1) = ρN, where ρ (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1) is a free parameter and N the number of trials (= 70) in the decisionmaking block (14, 15) . Importantly, the Priormodel only had one system (i.e., instrumental), which allows eventually overcoming the influence of misleading threat instructions. The Priormodel thereby predicts the largest influence of threat instructions on decision-making at the outset of the decision-making block, and the smallest at the end of the decision-making block. 
Difference in predictions from the Competing Systems -and Prior -models
To understand which features of the data distinguished between the prediction of the prior and competing systems models, we compared the fitted model predictions ( Figure S11 ). As expected from the formulation of the Priormodel, we found that the models make divergent predictions at the beginning of the experiment, where the prior model accounts better for the initial difference between the groups than the competing systems -model (cf. Figure 1) . The average absolute difference between the model predictions was indeed largest at the outset of the experiment (black dotted line, Figure S11 ). 
Experiment 3B
In addition to the novel instructed threat learning paradigm we present in the main text (Experiment 3), we had originally conducted a more traditional variant of an instructed threat learning experiment (Experiment 3B, N = 40, 18 women, mean age = 26). In this standard paradigm (2) participants were instructed that they would receive shocks to one cue (CS+) but not the other (CS-) (2) . In contrast to Experiment 3, the CS cues were then presented without reinforcement for the same total number of times as in Experiments 1-2, potentially leading to stronger expectation violation and lower inferred reliability of the environment in this experiment compared to the observational threat learning experiment. The instruction resulted in a clear differential SCR response during the conditioning block (t(39) = 9.12, p < .0001), indicating successful instructed threat learning. However, there was no evidence for transfer to decision-making (β = 0.27, SE = 0.27, z = 1.0, p = 0.32, 95 % CI [-.79, 0.26]), or an interaction between Phase and Group (χ 2 (1) = 0.06, p = .81) in Experiment 3B ( Figure S12 ).
Although these result are intriguing, it is possible that participants learned that the environment could not be trusted, due to the omission of the expected shocks, which may have resulted in an extinction of the instructed threat expectancy. The version of Experiment 3 presented in the main text circumvents this concern, and shows that that instructed threat learning can transfer to decision-making.
Although no transfer effect was visible when averaged across trials, computational modelling can allow estimating more subtle behavioral effects than direct comparison of means. We therefore estimated the same set of social learning models for Experiment 3B as reported for Experiment 3 in the main text. Replicating the finding that instructed threat learning is best understood as a prior on the instrumental system, the Prior - In contrast to Experiments 1-3, there was no difference between the groups in fraction of optimal responses during neither the Transfer phase (trials 1-35, see Fig. 1 ), nor the Reversal phase (trials 36-70). The solid lines show the a priori predictions from the competing systemsmodel.
Experiment 3C
In Experiment 3C (N = 40, 25 women, mean age = 24.9), we investigated how a learning environment that provided both instruction of threat and actual experience of shock influenced decision-making. As in Experiments 3, participants were instructed that they would receive shocks to one cue (CS+) but not the other (CS-) at the start of the conditioning block, and (as text on screen) before every CS presentation. In contrast to Experiments 3, participants in Experiment 3C in addition experienced shocks in accordance to these instructions (following the same conditioning schedule as in Experiment 1). This design prevented violation of expectations arising from instructions in a different manner than Experiment 3. Moreover, it allowed us to estimate how the combination of instructed threat learning and fully-expected direct shock experience transfers to decision-making. As expected, Experiment 3C replicated both the Transfer (β = -0.88, SE = 0.38, z = -2.31, p = .02, 95% CI [-1.63, -0.14]), and reversal (Group*Reversal: χ 2 (1) = 8.1, p = .004) of Pavlovian threat learning to decision-making ( Figure S13 ). Next, we compared Experiments 3 and 3C to discern if transfer was stronger when instruction and direct experience were combined (as in Experiment 3C) than for instruction alone (Experiment 3, main text). This was not the case (simple interaction, Group*Experiment: β = 0.428, SE = 0.24, z = 1.8, p = 0.08). If anything (based on the non-significant interaction estimate), transfer was stronger following instructed threat learning in the absence of shocks. Furthermore, there was no evidence for a difference between experiments in the Group*Reversal interaction (χ 2 (1) = 0.3, p = .59). In other words, the combination of instruction and direct experience (Experiment 3C) did not result in more potent transfer to decision-making than instruction alone (Experiment 3).
For completeness, we fitted the Competing Systemsand Priormodels to the data from Experiment 3C. The Priormodel explained the data best (wAIC (Prior) ~ 1), suggesting that threat instructions constituted the most important influence on decisionmaking in Experiment 3C. This result resembles previous reports of equivalent shock expectancies and SCRs after threat instruction on its own, and after combined threat instruction and direct shock experience (16) . 
